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WRITTEN STATEMENT OF ORIN S. KERR 
 
The current version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) poses a threat 
to the civil liberties of the millions of Americans who use computers and the Internet. As 
interpreted by the Justice Department, many if not most computer users violate the CFAA 
on a regular basis.   Any of them could face arrest and criminal prosecution. 
In the Justice Department’s view, the CFAA criminalizes conduct as innocuous as 
using a fake name on Facebook or lying about your weight in an online dating profile. 
That situation is intolerable.  Routine computer use should not be a crime.  Any 
cybersecurity legislation that this Congress passes should reject the extraordinarily broad 
interpretations endorsed by the United States Department of Justice.  
In my testimony, I want to explain why the CFAA presents a significant threat to 
civil liberties.  I want to then offer two narrow and simple ways to amend the CFAA to 
respond to these problems.  I will conclude by responding to arguments I anticipate the 
Justice Department officials might make in defense of the current statute.  
 
I. My Experience With the CFAA 
 
Before I begin, let me briefly explain my experience with the CFAA.   I have 
worked with the CFAA at various times in the capacity of prosecutor, legal scholar, and 
defense attorney.  I first began studying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1998, 
when I joined the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section in the Criminal 
Division of the United States Department of Justice.  From 1998 to 2001, I assisted in the 
investigation and prosecution of many CFAA cases as a Justice Department Trial 
Attorney and as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia.     
In 2001, I joined the faculty at George Washington University Law School.   
Since that time, I have authored a chapter of a law school casebook on the CFAA, and I 
have taught the law of the CFAA in a course on computer crime law.  See Orin S. Kerr, 
Computer Crime Law 26-109 (West 2nd ed. 2009).   I have also written two law review 
articles about the Act.   See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561 (2010); Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting 
“Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 NYU L. Rev. 1596 
(2003).   
Finally, I have also worked as a defense attorney and consulted with defense 
lawyers in CFAA cases on a pro bono basis to try to block the expansive readings of the 
Act that are the subject of my testimony.  In particular, I briefed and argued the 
successful motion to dismiss in the so-called  “MySpace Suicide” case.  See United States 
v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  My written testimony draws from all of these 
experiences, although of course it is made entirely in my personal capacity. 
 
II. The Extraordinary Scope of 18 U.S.C. §1030, the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act. 
 
When the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was first enacted in the 1980s, it was a 
narrow statute that targeted computer hacking and other harmful computer misuse.    
Over the last 25 years, however, Congress has broadened the statute dramatically four 
different times:  in 1986, 1996, 2001, and 2008.   Each of these amendments significantly 
expanded the reach of the statute.   Today’s statute is breathtakingly broad, and its key 
terms are subject to a wide range of interpretation that can make it so broad as to render 
the statute unconstitutionally vague.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges 
to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561 (2010).   
A quick look at the broadest crime in the statute reveals the problem.  The 
broadest provision of the broadest crime, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), punishes whoever 
“intentionally . . . exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any 
protected computer.”    We can break this federal crime into its three elements as follows: 
 
(1) Intentionally exceeds authorized access 
(2)  Obtains information 
(3) From a protected computer 
 
Critically, elements (2) and (3) will be satisfied in most instances of routine computer 
usage. Element (2), the requirement that a person “obtains information,” is satisfied by 
merely observing information.  See, e.g., United States v. Tolliver, 2009 WL 2342639  
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-432 at 2484 (1986)).  The statute does not require 
that the information be valuable or private. Any information of any kind is enough.  
Routine and entirely innocent conduct such as visiting a website, clicking on a hyperlink, 
or opening an e-mail generally will suffice.  
Element (3) is easily satisfied because almost everything with a microchip counts 
as a protected computer.  The device doesn’t need to be what most people think of as a 
“computer,” and it doesn’t need to be connected to the Internet.    Consider the relevant 
definitions.     Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), a “computer” is defined as: 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and 
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does 
not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
calculator, or other similar device[.] 
 
This definition “captures any device that makes use of a electronic data processor.”  
United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011).   Indeed, the Justice 
Department has argued that any “electronic, magnetic, optical, [and] electrochemical” 
data processing device is included, whether or not it is “high speed.” Id. at n.3.   Given 
that many everyday items include electronic data processors, the definition might 
plausibly include everything from many children’s toys to some of today’s toasters and 
coffeemakers.    
The statutory requirement that the computer must be a “protected” computer does 
not provide an additional limit.  In 2008, Congress amended the definition of “protected” 
computer to include any computer “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).   In federal law, regulation that “affects 
interstate or foreign commerce” is a term of art: It means that the regulation shall extend 
as far as the Commerce Clause allows. See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 849 
(1985).    Under the aggregation principle of Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), this 
appears to include all computers, period.  As a result, every computer is a “protected” 
computer.  
Because elements (2) and (3) are so extraordinarily broad, liability for federal 
crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) hinges largely on the first element:  What 
conduct “exceeds authorized access”?   That phrase is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6):  
the term “exceeds authorized access” means to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter. 
 
This provides little guidance, unfortunately, as the definition is largely circular.   Under 
the definition, conduct exceeds authorization if it exceeds entitlement.  But what 
determines entitlement?   The statute doesn’t say, and that failure to provide guidance has 
allowed the Justice Department to adopt extremely broad readings of what might exceed 
authorized access.  
 As a practical matter, the key question has become whether conduct “exceeds 
authorized access” merely because it violates a written restriction on computer access 
such as the Terms of Use of a website.  The Justice Department has taken the position 
that it does.   This interpretation has the effect of prohibiting an extraordinary amount of 
routine computer usage.   It is common for computers and computer services to be 
governed by Terms of Use or Terms of Service that are written extraordinarily broadly.  
Companies write those conditions broadly in part to avoid civil liability if a user of the 
computer engages in wrongdoing.  If Terms of Use are written to cover everything 
slightly bad about using a computer, the thinking goes, then the company can’t be sued 
for wrongful conduct by an individual user.   Those terms are not designed to carry the 
weight of criminal liability.  As a result, the Justice Department’s view that such written 
Terms should define criminal liability – thus delegating the scope of criminal law online 
to the drafting of Terms by computer owners – triggers a remarkable set of consequences. 
A few examples emphasize the point: 
(a) The Terms of Service of the popular Internet search engine Google.com says 
that “[y]ou may not use” Google if “you are not of legal age to form a binding contract 
with Google.”   http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited November 14, 2011).    
The legal age of contract formation in most states is 18.  As a result, a 17-year-old who 
conducts a Google search in the course of researching a term paper has likely violated 
Google’s Terms of Service.  According to the Justice Department’s interpretation of the 
statute, he or she is a criminal. 
(b) The Terms of Use of the popular Internet dating site Match.com says that 
“You will not provide inaccurate, misleading or false information . . .  to any other 
Member.”  http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last visited November 14, 
2011).     If a user writes in his profile that he goes to the gym every day – but in truth he 
goes only once a month – he has violated Match.com’s Terms of Use.  Similarly, a man 
who claims to be 5 foot 10 inches tall, but is only 5 foot 9 inches tall, has violated the 
Terms.  So has a woman who claims to 32 years old but really is 33 years old.  One study 
has suggested that about 80% of Internet dating profiles contain false or misleading 
information about height, weight and age alone.  See John Hancock, et. al., The Truth 
about Lying in Online Dating Profiles (2007), available at 
https://www.msu.edu/~nellison/hancock_et_al_2007.pdf.    If that estimate is correct, 
most Americans who have an Internet dating profiles are criminals under the Justice 
Department’s interpretation of the CFAA.  
 (C)  Terms of Use can be arbitrary and even nonsensical.   Anyone can set up a 
website and announce whatever Terms of Use they like.  Perhaps the Terms of Use will 
declare that only registered Democrats can visit the website; or only people who have 
been to Alaska; or only people named “Frank.”  Under the Justice Department’s 
interpretation of the statute, all of these Terms of Use can be criminally enforced.    It is 
true that the statute requires that the exceeding of authorized access be “intentional,” but 
this is a very modest requirement because the element itself is so easily satisfied.  
Presumably, any user who knows that the Terms of Use exist, and who intends to do the 
conduct that violated the Term of Use, will have “intentionally” exceeded authorized 
access.  
 I do not see any serious argument why such conduct should be criminal.   
Computer owners and operators are free to place contractual restrictions on the use of 
their computers.   If they believe that users have entered into a binding contract with 
them, and the users have violated the contract, the owners and operators can sue in state 
court under a breach of contract theory.  But breaching a contract should not be a federal 
crime.   The fact that persons have violated an express term on computer usage simply 
says nothing about whether their conduct is harmful and culpable enough to justify 
criminal punishment.   There may be cases in which harmful conduct happens to violate 
Terms of Use, and if so, those individuals should be punished under criminal statutes 
specifically prohibiting that harmful conduct.    But the act of violating Terms of Service 
alone should not be criminalized.  
 
III.   Two Statutory Solutions to the Overbreadth of the CFAA 
Fortunately, there are two simple ways to amend the CFAA to cure its 
overbreadth. The first solution is to amend the statutory definition of “exceeds authorized 
access” in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) to clarify that should not be interpreted to prohibit 
Terms of Service violations.  The Senate Judiciary Committee recently approved an 
amendment to a pending bill, S.1151, that includes such language limiting the scope of 
the CFAA.  As amended, Section 110 of S.1151 states: 
Section 1030(e)(6) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking 
‘‘alter;’’ and inserting ‘‘alter, but does not include access in violation of a 
contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or 
terms of service agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet 
website, or non-government employer, if such violation constitutes the 
sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer is 
unauthorized;’’ 
 
This is a very helpful amendment, and I endorse it.  To be sure, it is not a model of 
clarity.  It defines “exceeds authorized access” by what it isn’t rather than by what it is, 
which may lead to confusion.  It also leaves unclear when a violation should be deemed 
	the “sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer is unauthorized,” as 
compared to merely one part of that basis.   But I read the amendment as indicating that 
the Justice Department generally cannot bring prosecutions based on violations of Terms 
of Service and Terms of Use.   
Notably, the language carves out one significant exception. The government can 
pursue prosecutions for violations of computer use policies used by government 
employees.   This will enable prosecutions when government officials misuse sensitive 
government databases.  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 
2010) (allowing a criminal prosecution of a Social Security Administration employee for 
accessing Social Security Administration databases for nonbusiness reasons in violation 
of workplace policies).   Many government workplace computer use policies protect 
important government interests, and violations of such policies can trigger significant 
societal harms. As a result, it is sensible that the Justice Department’s broad theory of the 
CFAA should be retained in that specific setting. Other uses of the Justice Department’s 
broad theory will be prohibited.  
 (b) An alternative statutory solution would be to limit § 1030(a)(2) directly by 
creating significant limits on the kind of information that can trigger liability under 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(A)-(C).  As explained above, the current version of § 1030(a)(2) is 
triggered when an individual obtains any information.  It doesn’t matter what the 
information is, or whether it has any value.  This means that the prohibition can apply 
even to violating arbitrary Terms of Use that protect websites that contain no private or 
valuable information.  To correct this, the statute could be rewritten to limit § 1030(a)(2) 
to obtaining the specific kinds of information that, when obtained in excess of 
authorization, are associated with significant harms.    For example, § 1030(a)(2) could 
apply only when an individual obtains: 
(a) information with a value of more than $5,000; or 
(b) sensitive or private information involving an identifiable individual 
(including such information in the possession of a third party), including 
medical records, wills, diaries, private correspondence, financial records, 
or photographs of a sensitive or private nature;  
 
Under this proposal, violating Terms of Service could still violate the CFAA in some 
cases.    However, liability only would extend to the rare violations of Terms of Service 

in which the violation allowed an individual to obtain very valuable or very private 
information to which they were not entitled.   These will tend to be the rare cases in 
which the violation of an express term on computer use is associated with a harm that 
might justify criminal prosecution.   
 
IV. Responses to Anticipated Counterarguments 
I anticipate that the Justice Department will defend the current state of the law 
with three related arguments.  The first argument I anticipate is that although the current 
language of the statute is tremendously broad, the Justice Department can be trusted with 
this power because it has not often abused its authority under the statute.  The second 
argument is that the Justice Department needs maximum discretion in this area to account 
for the unpredictability of technological change.  The third argument I anticipate is that 
the broad reading of the statute is helpful to the Justice Department because it may make 
it easier to punish some individuals who have caused harms using computers.  
I’ll start with the first argument, that the Justice Department can be trusted with 
this power because it has exercised its discretion wisely   This argument is problematic 
for two reasons.  First, it appears to misunderstand the proper role of Congress and the 
Executive branch in the enforcement of criminal law.  It is the responsibility of the 
United States Congress to enact criminal laws that only prohibit conduct that is harmful, 
culpable, and deserving of criminal punishment.  It is the responsibility of the Executive 
to enforce those violations in appropriate cases.  This division of duties does not allow 
Congress to write DOJ a blank check, and for DOJ to be the ultimate arbiter of what is 
criminal.    
This argument is also weak because the Justice Department’s broad interpretation 
of the CFAA has not been clearly endorsed by the courts, meaning that it is not at all 
clear that the prosecutors actually enjoy the discretion they might claim to have wisely 
exercised.  In the one and only criminal prosecution for violating Internet terms of 
service, the district court rejected the Justice Department’s interpretation as 
unconstitutional and dismissed the charges.  See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 
(C.D. Cal. 2009).   The Justice Department declined to pursue an appeal from that ruling.  
Just a few weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for rehearing en 
banc in the first criminal prosecution based on violations of a private-sector employee 
computer use policy.  See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g 
granted, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 5109831 (October 27, 2011).   In light of the judicial 
resistance to the Justice Department’s efforts to read the CFAA so broadly, it would be 
premature for Justice Department officials to commend themselves for how prosecutors 
have exercised the power that prosecutors may or may not have. 
I am also unpersuaded by the second argument I anticipate, that the Justice 
Department needs maximum discretion in this area to account for the unpredictability of 
technological change.  This argument might have been persuasive in the 1980s, when 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1030.   It might have made sense in the 1990s, when most 
Americans first began to use the Internet regularly.  But the argument doesn’t work in 
late 2011, more than a quarter-century after the passage of the CFAA.  The basic ways 
that computers might be misused have been well-known for decades.  The concepts and 
principles are the same today as they were twenty years ago.  There is little new under the 
sun, and therefore no apparent need for maximum discretion to account for technological 
change. 
The third and final argument I anticipate is that the broad reading of the statute is 
helpful to the Justice Department because it may facilitate punishment of some 
individuals who have caused harms using computers.   If Justice Department officials 
make this argument, I urge the Committee to ask for specific scenarios and to make sure 
that the conduct described isn’t already criminal under other provisions of the criminal 
code.   Making a threat using a computer already violates the federal threat statute, for 
example.  Stealing trade secrets using a computer already violates the federal theft of 
trade secrets statute.  It is hard to see what value there is in making such conduct also a 
CFAA violation.     
Indeed, it is easy to see the harms of doing so.  A broad reading of the CFAA that 
effectively makes it illegal to do anything harmful using a computer would mean that the 
carefully-crafted statutory scheme of federal criminal law would be trumped whenever a 
computer is involved.  If computer-related conduct is harmful, prosecutors should charge 
the preexisting crimes that relate to the harm.  They should not use the CFAA as a catch-
all.   

The pending case of United States v. Nosal provides a helpful illustration of the 
problem.  The facts of Nosal justify a theft of trade secrets prosecution: Nosal allegedly 
worked with employees of his old company to help steal secrets from that company so he 
could set up a competing business.   The Justice Department charged the defendants with 
both theft of trade secrets and violating the CFAA.   The trade secrets charge was based 
on stealing trade secrets, and the CFAA charge was based on the employees’ violating a 
workplace computer policy that banned use for reasons other than official company 
business.   If the Ninth Circuit allows the CFAA charges in Nosal to proceed, the CFAA 
charges will be much easier to prove.  Establishing a theft of trade secrets requires 
proving all the elements of the crime, and that can be a difficult task.  In contrast, proving 
that an employee did something for reasons other than official company business is vastly 
easier.  To my mind, allowing this theory would set a dangerous precedent. If the 
government is really bringing the prosecution because of the alleged theft of trade secrets, 
the government should have to prove a theft of trade secrets.  
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.  I look forward to your questions. 
 
____________ 
 
